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Dear Dr. Parkinson:
In response to your letter of April 7, 1995, _ requesting that the Task Force examine a number
of specific issues related to the Shuttle-lVfir program, I formed three small teams composed of
Task Force members and technical advisors 2 to address the following issues:
1. Preliminary results from STS-71 and the status of preparations for STS-74.
2. NASA's presence in Russia.
3. NASA's automated data processing and telecommunications (ADP/T) infrastructure in
Russia.
During the period between April and the July 19 Task Force meeting, these teams conducted
extensive research. The teams presented their observations and suggested recommendations at
the July 19 meeting. The Task Force approved and adopted the observations and
recommendations presented by the three review teams. Accordingly, the three review team
reports have been incorporated into the enclosed flRh report of the Task Force.
Please be advised that the Task Force will continue to review preparations for STS-74 over the
next several months. I will convene the sixth meeting of the Task Force prior to the launch of
STS-74 and will submit a report of the Task Force's findings.
Sincerely,
P. Sta_offAF (Ret.)
Enclosure
Letter, Dr. Bradford Parkinson, Chairman of the NASA Advisory Council, to Lt. Gem Thomas P.
Stafford, Chairman of the NASA Advisory Council Task Force on the Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and
Docking Missions, April 7, 1995 (see Appendix 2).
2 See Appendix 3 for a list of review team members.
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RESULTSFROM STS-71AND PREPARATIONS FOR STS-74
1. BACKGROUND
In his April 7, 1995, letter 1 to Lt. Gen. Thomas P. Stafford, the Chairman of the NASA
Advisory Council on the Shuttle/MAr Rendezvous and Docking Missions, Dr. Bradford
Parkinson requested that the Task Force examine a number of specific issues related to the
Shuttle-Mir program including the preliminary results from STS-71 and the status of
preparations for STS-74.
Several of the Task Force members and technical advisors had already been monitoring
preparations for the STS-71 mission since the inception of the Task Force in May 1994. Their
initial observations and recommendations for STS-71 preparations were included in previous
Task Force reports dated June 6, 1994, July 29, 1994, November 2, 1994, and March 1, 1995.
The Task Force STS-71 review team 2 reported to Gen. Stafford on June 28, 1995, that
all outstanding technical issues regarding the mission had been resolved and that no safety of
flight concerns existed. The STS-71 rendezvous and docking mission with the kfir station was
highly successful.
At the July 19 Open Meeting of the Task Force, Mr. Tommy Holloway, in his capacity
as Phase 1 (Shutfle-lVfir) Program Manager, and members of the Phase 1 team presented a
complete and thorough series of briefings which included preliminary results, lessons learned,
and issues as well as preparations for STS-74. Mr. Holloway and his team professionally
handled all questions and areas of concern raised by the Task Force and answered them in
detail.
In reviewing the results of this mission, it should be noted that a priority structure,
established prior to the Mir 18 main expedition/STS-71 mission, ranked the Phase I Program's
mission goals as follows:
(1) Establishing working relationships between NASA and the Russian Space Agency
(RSA).
Letter, Dr. Bradford Parkinson, Chairman of the NASA Advisory Council, to It. Gen. Thomas P. Stafford,
Chairman of the NASA Advisory Council Task Force on the Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and Docking Missions,
April 7, 1995 (see Appendix 2).
2 STS-71 and STS-74 Preparation Review Team members are listed in Appendix 3.
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(2) Conducting risk mitigation activities which can provide meaningful results in a timely
manner to have application to the International Space Station (ISS):
• Hardware performance evaluations
• Characterization of the lVfu- environment
• Joint science and mission operations; and
• Joint hardware integration.
(3) Gaining experience in long-duration operations in space and extended human space
flight in preparation for the ISS.
(4) Providing an early opportunity to conduct scientific and technological research on a
long-duration orbital platform.
The following observations and recommendations on the STS-71 mission and concerns
for the upcoming STS-74 mission are based on the work performed by the Task Force STS-71
and STS-74 Preparation Review Team and the presentations made by the Phase 1 team at the
July 19 Open Meeting.
2. STS-71 RESULTS
2.1. Loads and Dynamics
Observations:
There were no noticeable effects of Reaction Control System (RCS) plume
impingement on the _ solar panels during the approach. As expected, the desired radius
vector (R-bar) approach required no braking during the approach. The one Primary Reaction
Control System (PRCS) attitude correction firing inside 30 feet from the Shuttle and the Mir
had no adverse results.
The preliminary estimated docking loads were well under the maximum allowable
values (1,000 kg vs. 1,900 kg). Because contact misalignments were virtually non-existent,
post-capture rotation (2 degrees) and stabilization time (60 seconds) were minimal.
A mated PRCS structural dynamics test was conducted as planned on flight day 5.
Results proved that the mated stack structural characteristics were weU within the preflight
design margins, lending credibility previously developed, but as yet untested, to the engineering
math models.
Shuttle Vernier Reaction Control System (VR.CS) control performance of the mated
stack was nominal. Stack stayed within plus/minus 10 degrees in all axes with very low rates
as predicted. Propellant usage was higher than expected, but analysis of flight data and
potential VRCS thrust model updates are in work. Mir control performance was also nominal,
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but it too required more Mir PRCS firings than predicted to desaturate the gyrodynes. After
one minor attitude trim, the stack was extremely gable in gravity-gradient operations.
2.2 Approach Profile
Observations:
The R-bar approach was flown to perfection by Commander Robert Gibson and the
STS-71 crew. As expected, reduced up firing jets for braking resulted in the minimum possible
plume loads and contamination on the l_fir solar panels.
Recommendation 2-2.2.1
The R-bar approach is the preferred approach for operations such as the Shuttle-
Mir rendezvous and docking missions.
2.3 Communications
Observations:
During STS-71, all Mission Control Center-Houston (MCC-I-I) to M_ssion Control
Center- Moscow (MCC-M) voice loops functioned very well, and no outages occurred during
the flight. The transfer ofttight and experiment-related information during the mission
continued to improve and provided an excellent example of successful joint operations. One
communication-related concern which attracted attention was the reduced staf_g of MCC-M
on nights and weekends; however, solutions to this situation are currently in work.
For air-to-air communications, the Shuttle Very High Frequency (VHF) radio worked
well with only minor noise and "vox" keying problems - both of which are being remedied.
The window VHF antenna performed very well and will be used on STS-76 and subsequent
Phase 1 missions. Air-to-ground communications were adequate with coverage provided by
Russian ground stations with frequent supplementary coverage fi'om both Luch
communications satellites. When both satellites were providing coverage, nearly continuous
coverage was available.
2.3.1 Observations: Dedicated U.S. Crew Communications
The one exception to an otherwise completely satisfactory situation was the lack of
dedicated communications time for the U.S. crewman. This is a significant problem and an
area worthy of some attention since dedicated communications time is essential to the U.S.
crew aboard the Mir for completion of scientific and medical operations, psychological support
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andalleviationof cultural isolation. Although weekly dedicated video communications
sessions were planned during the _ 18 mission, these sessions did not materialize until the
end of the mission and were quite unsatisfactory in terms of frequency, duration and quality.
Currently opportunities for such communications are limited since dedicated communication is
only possible during passes over Russian ground sites. Depending on revolutions and orbital
planes, there may be several hours when there is no communication with the ground. Satellite
coverage is available, but not oRen, due to costs. As a result, U.S. communications using the
satellite were hampered with time delays and poor voice circuit quality. In future missions,
weekly dedicated video communications between the STS and Mir crews and appropriate
ground personnel should be vigorously pursued.
Recommendation: 2-2.3.1.1
To minimize feelings of isolation among the U.S. crew when aboard the Mir
station, efforts should be made to ensure that the U.S. crew are provided with dedicated
air to ground communications time.
2.3.2 Observations: Dedicated U.S./Russian Crew Communications
Similarly important is the maximization of the interfaces between the Shuttle and biir
crews prior to the Shuttle launches to the Mir station. One way of accomplishing this is to
increase the opportunities for the pre-launch Shuttle crew to communicate with the orbiting
l_ftr crew in the weeks prior to the rendezvous and docking launch of the Shuttle. The
STS-71/Mir 18 crews were awarded one crew-dedicated communication opportunity prior to
the first Shuttle-Mir rendezvous and docking mission. Future Shuttle-_fir rendezvous and
docking missions would benefit from an increase in such crew-dedicated communications
opportunities.
Lack of dedicated communications time also limits opportunities for the U.S. and
Russian crews to interface and the Phase 1 Science Program's Principal Investigators
(PI's)/Scientists or their representatives to discuss requirements. In this instance, an expanded
communications capability would ensure better integration of on-orbit work for both U.S. and
Russian crews in near real-time, especially if ground training is less than originally planned.
Recommendation: 2-2.3.2.1
To maximize interface opportunities between the orbiting Mir crew and the pre-
launch Shuttle crew prior to Shuttle launches to the Mir station, efforts should be made
to ensure that the crews are provided with additional communications opportunities
during the weeks preceding the mission.
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2.4 lVlir Electrical Power
Observations:
Adequate electrical power required continuous attention and often careful scheduling
and prioritizing of activities during the Mir 18 expedition. Because of the Spektr and Kvant-2
solar array anomalies (described in section 2.7 below), the average solar array production was
approximately 294 amps with an average bus load of 141 amps. A subsequent Extra-
Vehicular Activity (EVA) on July 14, 1995, freed the blocked Kvant-2 array and deployed all
but the fifth panel of the Spektr array. The current configuration is producing 450+ amps with
a bus load of 160 amps. On the _vfir station, there are now 31 batteries available with a total
capacity of 1680 amp-hours, and more new batteries to be delivered to the Mir on STS-74 and
STS-76.
2.5 Mir Cabin Leak
Observations:
On May 30, 1995, the Mir crew discovered a cabin pressure leak after Kristall was
moved to the -Z axis of the transfer node. They located and temporarily fixed the leak by
using tape, but the leak re-occurred causing the crew to move Kristall back to the -X axis on
June 10, 1995, (10 days ahead of schedule) and the leak stopped. With the leak isolated to the
-Z axis docking port of the transfer node, the STS-71 crew delivered a leak sealing kit and bolt
tool to Mir. After an EVA inspection of the -Z axis port on July 14, 1995, Kristall was moved
back to that port and no leak has been detected.
2.6 Untended Mir Operations
Observations:
On April 1995, the Russians proposed undocking the Soyuz with the 1Vfir 19 crew,
photographing the STS-71 undocking, and then re-docking the Soyuz to the Mir. Although
this proposal presented no significant threat to crew safety, NASA Johnson Space Center
(JSC) operations personnel and members of the Task Force were concerned with the possible
inability of the Soyuz to re-dock with the Mir. Had Soyuz failed to re-dock, it would have
returned to Earth and left the Mir untended for approximately two months. JSC operations
personnel and the Task Force felt that there was some risk of losing the Mir station while it
was untended since the station had recently required frequent inflight maintenance actions
performed during the Mir 18 mission.
A decision was made, however, to undock the Soyuz prior to the STS-71 undocking
for photographic documentation. While the _ was unattended, an erroneous ground
command from MCC-M computers caused a main flight computer shutdown which resulted in
a Mir attitude control failure. The failure put the Soyuz re-docking at risk, but the crew
5
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rapidlyexecuteda successful manual re-docking with _ in free dri_ ahead of the planned
timeline. However, it is important to note that had this _ attitude control failure occurred
during the Shuttle approach, it would have prevented the Shuttle-Mir docking.
Recommendation: 2-2.6.1
In future discussions with the Russians regarding untended Mir station
operations, particularly during Shuttle-Mir missions, NASA should stress the risks
inherent in such operations and request that such operations be conducted only when
necessary to conduct essential repairs or maintenance on the Mir station.
2.7 lVfir Solar Array Status: Spektr Solar Array Release and Kvant-2 Solar Array Release
2.7.1 Observations: Spektr Solar Array Release
During deployment of the Spektr solar arrays, one of the four arrays failed to deploy
automatically due to an incorrect sequence commanded by the ground computer. A single
launch restraint (18mm aluminum tube with 3mm walls and deactivated external wires) had to
be cut to flee the array. The location and transition path provisions were limited, and standard
Russian and U.S. tools would not satisfy the worksite reach and tube size requirements.
Russian and U.S. tools were created, certified and flown on STS-71 (a one week U.S. effort).
The _ 19 crew was trained with the U.S. tool before leaving for the Kennedy Space Center
(KSC) and a water tank test was conducted in Moscow using the JSC supplied tool for further
verification. On July 14, 1995, the Mir 19 crew successfully used the U.S. tool to cut the
restraint and aLlow the deployment sequence to continue. The actual cutting time was three
minutes. As a result of this action, four of the five panels on the array deployed. The JSC and
Russian teams are assessing the causes preventing full deployment of the array.
2.7.2 Observations: Kvant-2 Solar Array Release
During a 1_ 18 EVA to relocate one Kristall solar array to Kvant- 1, the Strela cargo
crane was used to handle the stowed array. At the conclusion of this EVA, the end of the
extended crane was improperly attached to Kvant-2 and blocked free rotation of the Kvant-2
solar array, limiting the power generating capability of the array. On July 14, 1995, the EVA
crew corrected the cargo boom tether configuration which eliminated the interference problem
and restored full rotation capability to the array.
2.8 Halon 1301
Observations:
RSA expressed a concern regarding a potential leak and use of the Shuttle's Halon fire
extinguisher. RSA was concerned was that the high temperature of the Mir oxygen candle,
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when burned, would break down the Halon gas leaked or released from the Shuttle fire
extinguisher into a toxic product.
In response to this concern, JSC conducted a study, and provided data to RSA
concluding that the concentration level would not create a toxic hazard. Procedurally, ISC
proposed that, if the crew used Halon gas to extinguish a fire or detected a Halon leak, they
would close the hatches to the Mir as soon as possible. This response was accepted by the
Joint Flight Operations and Systems Integration Working Group (WG-3).
2.9 Androgenous Peripheral Docking System (APDS)
Observations:
The APDS docking mechanism performed flawlessly during the STS-71 mission.
APDS kinematic and dynamic performance was monitored real-time during the mission using
telemetry data. Recreated contact conditions based on vehicle state vectors and camera views
showed that the Shuttle commander docked to Mir with near perfect performance as follows:
• Closing velocity 0.107 feet/second
• Lateral misalignment 0.7 inches
• Angular misalignment 0.4 degree/axis.
The correctness alignment resuked in a docking load of only 1,000 kg (load constraint was
1,900 kg) and this was dominated by the second phase of Post Contact Thrust (PCT) which
occurred aider capture.
2.10 Safety Certification Agreement
Observations:
Safety certification of all items to be transported in a pressurized volume to and fi'om
the lVfir, and for experiment hardware operations onboard _ and Shuttle, both docked and
undocked, was an issue which threatened to consume considerable time and resources.
Although both sides independently had thorough, extensive, proven criteria and processes to
certify hardware for flight, the processes were olden different from one another. In a
commendable effort, RSA, RSC-Energia, and NASA developed an abbreviated payload safety
assurance certification procedure. The fact that the experiment hardware and logistics were
common to both the U.S. and Russian space programs and were developed in compliance with
the space industry standards of each country assisted the real-time completion of this
agreement. This agreement will result in a significant savings in time and resources and should
be an example for further joint activities.
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RESEARCH ON STS-71
Accomplishments
Twenty-eight science experiments were conducted on STS-71, and common data
sets were established which permitted previous Russian and U.S. data comparisons.
The experiments spanned seven disciplines: metabolism, cardiovascular/pulmonary
medicine; sensory-motor/neuromuscular studies, behavior and performance;
hygiene, sanitation and radiation; fundamental biology; and microgravity. All
science experiments performed during the _fir 18/STS-71 mission were successful.
However, a few of the planned science experiments were pre-empted because of
medical recommendations, hardware inaccessibility and the priorities of Nfir
operations and EVA activities.
For the Mir 18 mission, joint U.S./Russian specialist teams trained the astronauts
and cosmonauts to perform a comprehensive program of medical, biological and
physical experiments. Many experiments utilized integrated systems of U.S. and
Russian hardware/protocols to expand the research capabilities for Shuttle-lVfir
cooperative efforts. Three Progress vehicles and the Russian Spektr module
transported U.S.-provided hardware to the Mir station.
During the "docked phase," the Mir 18/STS-71 crews transferred approximately
450 items between the Shuttle and Mir. The Shuttle provided 1,067 pounds of
water to the Mir (more than twice the amount originally planned).
Baseline Data Collection (BDC) facilities were established at the Gagarin
Cosmonaut Training Center (GCTC) in Russia. Over two tons of soientific
hardware were shipped and assembled in order to conduct preflight physiological
testing on the _ 18 crew members and their backups. This hardware will also be
used for data collection before and after future missions. In general, three preflight
BDC sessions were conducted on each crew member. One session was held in the
United States and two at the GCTC. BDC was performed by both U.S. and
Russian investigators, as well as GCTC trainers.
During the Mir 18/STS-71 mission, the crews collected the first U.S. long duration
space flight data since Skylab. Most data/samples were recorded or preserved and
returned to Earth, via the Space Shuttle, for post-flight analysis. Scientific data
collection from long-duration Nfir crew members was enhanced by intensive
medical studies performed onboard Spacelab-Nfir (STS-71), and preflight/post-
flight data collection.
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Fifty-seven research sessions were completed on STS-71, which was 91 percent of
the total sessions requested. Seventy-four science sessions were completed on the
lVfir 18 station with 100% of the environmental monitoring and fundamental
biology sessions completed and 80% of the metabolic sessions completed. Losses
in the cardiovascular and neuromuscular/neurosensory data were due to hardware
inaccessibility.
3.2 Issues
3.2.1 Crew Training/Hardware
Observations:
Crew training, as originally negotiated, presumed on-orbit assignment of science via
participation of U.S. crew and Russian crew in a ratio of 3 to 1 for the planned experiments.
The training schedule in Russia, and to a lesser extent in the U.S., was preempted at times due
to priorities associated with the training of the cosmonaut crew.
The documentation/certification process for the U.S. hardware and associated
procedures also affected crew training. Due to difficulties and delays in the process, it was
often difficult to provide proper fidelity training hardware in a timely fashion. This resulted in
some inherent inflexibility and loss of efficiency and time in the crew training process.
Additionally, once the training schedules are agreed upon, it is difficult to diverge from the
schedule because of the attendant infrastructure of both the U.S. and Russian flight operations
systems.
Lessons Learned
Whenever possible, more active participation of the Russian cosmonauts would enhance
the science program. With respect to training and crew participation, U.S. sessions with
Russian participation should be augmented to optimize the procedure development and
training quality. Specialized cosmonaut training should be provided, where possible, to
optimize their overall scientific training. With respect to crew training hardware, delivery
of all training hardware should occur as early as possible to facilitate adequate training; all
engineering documents of the 100 series should be provided to the GCTC; and U.S.
sessions with Russian participation should be augmented to optimize the procedure
development and training quality. Cosmonauts should be invited and encouraged to
participate more actively in the scientific protocols.
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Extensiveconsultationwith Russianspecialistshouldoccurprior to finalizing hardware
labeling. It is important to ensure that the training unit decal/labels are identical to the
flight unit decals/labels. Temperature logs should be included in appropriate hardware
shipping containers and preparations made to recover the experiment should the hardware
be compromised by abnormal high or low temperatures.
3.2.2 Inflight Experiments/Hardware
Observations:
Because the Mir 18 Russian crew was busy with housekeeping operations and multiple
EVA's to configure the _ftr for the delayed Spektr and for the arrival of STS-71, there were
periods of under-utilization for the U.S. astronaut and busy periods for the Russian
cosmonauts. Due to the delayed arrival of Spektr to orbit, the research hardware was not
available as previously planned. Hence, the Mir 18 crew--both cosmonauts and the U.S.
astronaut- were unable to complete the research planned for that portion of the mission.
In adaition, several experiments in the Neurology/Cardiology areas were not completed
during the mission, largely due to hardware unavailability. However, as mentioned previously,
significant amounts of data were collected pre and post flight on the long duration crew, and
baseline data collection capabilities in Russia were duplicated. All parties were satisfied with
the science/medical data that was collected.
Lessons Learned
• As the lifetime of the _fir increases, the irrflight requirements for maintenance can be
expected to impact the crew's ability to accomplish science objectives.
The Task Force feels that, when appropriate on future missions, the research program
should be established quickly and mutually endorsed. Specific areas of endorsement should
include the training schedule, customs clearance procedures, hardware acceptance and
realtime planning and support plans.
• Dietary restrictions imposed by metabolic experiments should take into account dietary
preferences of the participants.
It is imperative that the Shuttle/l_ Research Program establishes a replanning mechanism
to ensure that the U.S. crew is provided with sufficient experiments/hardware/work while
aboard the lVlir. Such replanning would minimize the impact of launch schedule
adjustments on planned science/hardware availability.
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In light of potential changes in the Russian Priroda module launch schedule, such
replanning may be necessary to minimize research impacts on all subsequent NASA/Mir
missions. The Priroda is carrying hardware for U.S. crew-operated microgravity science
experiments for the STS-76 mission scheduled for March 1996. If the Priroda launches in
March 1996 versus December 1995, as originally planned, the hardware will not be
available, and if no adjustments are made, planned U.S. science will be impacted. NASA
cannot expect to solve this problem with Shuttle manifest adjustments or ground training of
the crew. Shuttle manifest adjustments impact all subsequent Shuttle missions, including
those with international participation. Ground training of the crew is not a reliable
alternative solution to this problem since this training is already limited by the amount and
fidelity of the hardware as well as the limited availability of training time for both U.S. and
Russian crews. For these reasons, the Shuttle/1War Science Program should adjust its
science/hardware requirements to the reality of schedule adjustments to ensure that the
U.S. crew has sufficient experiments/hardware and work while aboard the Mir.
The Russian lead timeliner who deals with the NASA Science Program is pivotal to
implementing and scheduling flight activities. The U.S. representative must continue to
establish a close and good working relationship with this person. Flight plans generated by
TsUP representatives must be well coordinated with the Flight Data File (FDF)
representative to ensure that experiment names on radiograms as consistent with the FDF.
3.2.3 Research-Related Communications
The Task Force's observations and recommendations regarding communications during
STS-71 are presented in section 2.3 of this report.
4. MEDICAL OPERATIONS
4.1 Medical Communications
Observations:
A very good working relationship was established among the individuals working in the
MCC-M during the mission, and the NASA medical support flight surgeons felt very much a
part of the overall operational team. In addition, the NASA medical operations and science
teams established an excellent working relationship. Both the science teams and the flight
surgeons found the interaction and data sharing quite helpful. Given the benefits of such
11
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collaboration, continued integration of the medical operations and science programs should be
pursued.
The Task Force's observations and its recommendation regarding medical
communications during STS-71 are presented in section 2.3 of this report.
5. STS-74 AND SUBSEQUENT MISSIONS
Based on discussions during its meeting on July 19, the Task Force identified the
following as concerns for STS-74 and subsequent missions:
• ADPS Pyrotechnic Bolt Status;
• STS-74 Docking Module Berthing and Docking;
• _ Electrical Power;
• EVA Plan for Risk Mitigation; and
• East Coast Abort Landing (ECAL) Sites for 51.6 degree Orbit Launches.
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1. NASA'S PRESENCE IN RUSSIA
1.1 Charter
NASA's cooperative efforts with Russian aerospace organizations, particularly the
ambitious undertakings of Phase 1 and Space Station development, are unique in the Agency's
international experience in both scope and depth. Given the critical nature of these efforts, the
NASA Administrator and senior NASA management saw a need for an independent review of
NASA's presence in Russia. As a result, the NASA Advisory Council (NAC) Chairman,
Dr. Bradford Parkinson, requested that Lt. General Thomas P. Stafford, in his capacity as
Chairman of the NAC Task Force on the Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and Docking Missions,
"review the overall NASA and associated contractor presence in Russia. "l
In response to Dr. Parkinson's request, Gen. Stafford formed a team of Task Force
members and technical advisors led by Col. James C. Adamson, USA (Pet.). 2 Between April
and July, this team received briefings from, and conducted extensive discussions with, NASA
managers, technical staff and contractors at NASA Headquarters, at the Johnson Space Center,
and in Russia. The team also held discussions with State Department officials in Washington.
In addition, the team met with senior officials at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, as well as
senior Russian officials in both Moscow and at the Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center
(CTC).
Based on these interviews, the review team prepared a series of observations and
proposed recommendations which were presented by Col. Adamson at the July 19, 1995, open
meeting of the Task Force. The observations and recommendations, as accepted by the Task
Force members, are provided in sections 2 and 3 of this report.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Establishment of the NASA Moscow Liaison Office and the Moscow Technical
Liaison Office
In May 1994, NASA and the Moscow Embassy/Department of State completed an
agreement for establishing a NASA office at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. This agreement
paved the way for NASA to establish the NASA Moscow Liaison Office and the Moscow
Letter, Dr. Bradford Parkinson, Chairman of the NASA Advisory Council, to Lt Gem. Thomas P.
Stafford, Chairman of the NASA Advisory Council Task Force on the Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and
Docking Missions, April 7, 1995 (see Appendix 2).
See Appendix 3 for a list of review team members.
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TechnicalLiaisonOffice(NMLO/MTLO) at the Moscow Embassy. The purpose of the
NMLO/MTLO was to represent NASA and to provide needed policy, administrative and
technical liaison support to NASA employees permanently or temporarily assigned to Russia in
support of the Space Station Program, including Phase 1.
Under the NASA-Department of State arrangement, NASA's presence in Russia is
sponsored by the State Department's Environment, Space and Technology section of the
Moscow Embassy. NASA's presence in the Moscow Embassy is compatible with the National
Security Decision Directive (NSDD)-38 and the NASA/Department of State Foreign Affairs
Administrative Support (FAAS) agreement and subject to specific conditions, including the
following:
• NASA personnel report to the Embassy Environmental, Science and Technology (EST)
Counselor in Moscow and through the EST Counselor to the Ambassador.
• NASA-funded full time employees in Russia carry out the responsibilities associated with
the assignment of diplomatic status and the title of attach6.
• NASA full time employees are evaluated by the EST Counselor in Moscow. This
evaluation will be included as part of the overall performance evaluation done by NASA.
• NASA personnel work near or in the Embassy rather than at Russian institutes.
• NASA seeks Russian language training for the two NASA staff assigned to EST positions.
• NASA and the Department of State periodically review and, when necessary, amend the
FAAS agreement for the provision of various services by the Embassy for NASA.
• NASA becomes part of the Embassy housing pool. As part of this pool, the Embassy witl
find apartments and negotiate and sign leases on behalf of the assigned NASA personnel.
• NASA staff arrives in mid-June 1994.
The Embassy Budget and Fiscal office provides payroll servicing to NASA American and
Foreign Service National (FSN) staff. NASA will use the Embassy's direct vehicle
operations only for vehicle registration and obtaining local insurance for privately-owned
vehicles and Government-owned vehicles. No other vehicle support will be provided by
the Embassy.
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1.2.2 Draft Memorandum of Understanding
The administrative and operational breakdown of responsibilities between NASA's
Office of External Relations (Code I) and Office of Space Flight (Code M) has been defined in
a draft Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between them, and is reflected in the
responsibilities assigned to the NMLO manager and the MTLO manager. In the proposed
MOU between Code I and Code M, the NASA Moscow Liaison Office (NMLO) represents
the interests of NASA Headquarters' Codes programmatically involved in Russia. (The
organizational structure of the N3/1LO and its primary interfaces and reporting paths are
illustrated m Figures I and 2.)
Under the terms of the draft MOU, Code I has responsibility for appointing a senior
manager as the NMLO manager. The primary responsibilities of this position include:
• serving as the NASA Administrator's representative in Russia and the primary point of
contact between the U.S. Embassy and all NASA personnel stationed in Russia;
• serving as the primary officer responsible for the NASA Administrator's visits to Russia;
• acting as the coordinator of the multiple NASA program representatives in Russia;
assisting NASA in meeting its mission objectives through administrative functions such as
letters of invitation for visitors, visa/passport issues (applications, extensions, multiple-
entry, country clearance, etc.), customs (shipping/receiving issues), embassy FAAS
agreements, NASA housing (leases, etc.), NMLO budget matters (planned annual
expenditures and spending authorization, etc.) and office facility requirements for NASA
support; and
• serving as the lead for NASA on Embassy issues and implementation of future joint
programs with the Russians.
Under the guidelines of the draft MOU, the MTLO manager who is appointed by
Code M:
• is administratively and technically responsible for the Space Station and Phase 1 personnel
stationed in Russia; and
Part 3: Russian Review - Management Team Report
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reports to Code M through the Space Station Program Office at the Johnson Space Center
(JSC) regarding his or her assignment, but will receive direction from the NMLO manager
on all administrative matters affecting the overall operation of the NMLO as agreed
between Code M and Code I. (The MTLO 's primary interfaces and reporting paths are
illustrated in Figure 3.)
1.2.3 OSF Groundrules
The administrative and operational groundrules for Office of Space Flight (OSF)
employees located in the MTLO were defined by Dr. J. Wayne Littles, Associate Administrator
for Space Flight, on February 21, 1995. Under these groundmles, OSF employees in Moscow
administratively report to the (Code I) NMLO manager, (i.e., the NASA Russian
Representative). At the same time, as de facto Embassy employees, OSF employees are
required at all times to be responsive to the U.S. Embassy's directives, policies and
requirements. Permanent NASA employees in Moscow on Space Station technical matters,
including Phase 1, are operationally responsible to the MTLO manager. All other OSF
employees in Moscow, i.e., those not directly assigned within the Space Station and Phase 1
program organizations, but working on Space Station or OSF matters are responsible for
keeping the MTLO advised of their permanent plans, status and outcome of their activities.
1.2.4 Functions of the MTLO
In providing technical and administrative support to Code M's Space Station and
Phase 1 programs in Russia, the MTLO:
• facilitates technical coordination between NASA's Space Station Program Office (SSPO)
in Houston, the Russian Space Agency 0LSA) and their contractors;
• performs program management and technical liaison between NASA and RSA;
• monitors and reports on the implementation of the Space Station Baseline;
• assesses progress on joint program objectives;
• facilitates technical coordination between NASA and RSA and their respective Space
Station program contractors;
• serves as the designated NASA representative on the RSA Scientific Technical Board
Meetings and other activities considering ISSA issues; and
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provides additional services to NASA's Space Station and Phase 1 Program personnel in
Moscow including support for administrative functions such as transportation and
accommodation arrangements, letters of invitation, and visas. These services have been
used by other NASA organizations outside of Space Station.
1.2.5 NMLO Representative Position Description
The NASA Russian Representative, as defined by Code I, reports to the Director, of
NASA Headquarter's International Relations Division. The position description for the
Russian Representative notes that he or she is responsible for monitoring and implementing
NASA and U.S. policies with Russian aeronautical and space communities, directing activities
associated with bilateral and multilateral agreements with Russia, and analyzing and reporting
on Russian national aeronautics and space programs. Candidacy requirements include:
experience in applying U.S. foreign policy objectives, practices and principles to the
planning and execution of scientific and technological programs;
experience in establishing and maintaining liaison with international public and
private sector organizations for the purpose of assuring understanding of program
objectives and content;
Russian language proficiency;
ability to work effectively with senior officials in the Department of State and other
U.S. foreign agencies; and
knowledge of research and development of high technology programs.
1.2.6 Differences between the Role of the NASA Russian Representative and NASA
European Representative
In reviewing NASA's NMLO operations it should be noted that the NASA Russian
Representative (NMLO manager) position was modeled after that of the current NASA
European Representative. Although both positions include high level NASA policy
responsibilities, the role of the NASA Russian Representative includes wide ranging
administrative, budgetary, and Embassy-related responsibilities not included in the role of the
NASA European Representative.
The NASA Russian Representative/NMLO manager heads the only NASA overseas
office with both a policy and technical role. He or she was envisioned to act as the coordinator
for the NASA program representatives in Russia; the European Representative, on the other
hand, requires no program co-location or technical liaison duties.
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NASA activitiesin Russia involve a high level of administrative overhead and
involvement by the NMLO. As a result, the NASA Russian Representative has extensive day-
to-day budgetary responsibility for processing funding through the Embassy, not only for the
NMLO itself, but for all the NASA organizations expending funds in order to buy goods and
services in Russia. The NASA European Representative has no budget to administer, or
comparable budgetary responsibilities relative to NASA organizations operating in Europe.
The NASA Russian Representative has a variety of administrative and fiscal responsibilities in
addition to his or her policy and liaison role. The NMLO provides services to an
unprecedented number of NASA travelers to Russia, including invitations required for the visa
process, and special arrangements for lodging.
The NASA Russian Representative represents in-country NASA personnel on the
Embassy team, and as such, has high visibility in the Moscow Embassy. The Ambassador has a
keen interest in NASA activities due, in part, to the close working relationship with the
Embassy's Environmental, Science and Technology Counselor. In contrast, the NASA
European Representative is not located in an American Embassy; therefore, he or she has no
direct relationship with the Ambassador that must be constantly and carefully maintained in
order to carry out his or her daily responsibilities.
1.2.7 Placement of Civil Servants in Russian Space Organizations
As previously mentioned, the Ambassador was initially opposed to placing civil
servants in Russian organizations. When NASA was originally looking for commercial space
in Moscow, the Ambassador made it clear that NASA personnel must be located on the
Embassy compound. However, after its first year in Moscow, the Ambassador has become
more accepting ofNASA's ideas for placing persons outside of the Embassy.
1.2.8 NASA Budget Operations in Russia
The NMLO budget is funded through NASA Institutional and Program funding. The
State Department and the U.S. Embassy are involved in disbursement of all NASA funds to be
spent locally in Moscow. Cables between NASA and State Department/U.S. Embassy are
required in order to authorize expenditure payment via Embassy. Because of the need to
process funding through the Embassy, the NASA NMLO office is the central point of contact
for all NASA organizations with requirements for expending funds to purchase goods and
services in Russia. The NASA organizations spending funds in Russia include: Space Station
Program Office - MTLO; lohnson Space Center - Shuttle/bfir GCTC Operations; Code I -
NMLO; and Code O - PSCN. The astronauts and life sciences personnel assigned to the
GCTC receive their paychecks through the Embassy. NASA personnel in the GCTC receive
administrative services including assistance with customs and visas from the NMLO at the
Embassy.
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AlthoughtheMTLO was established by, and receives its funding from, the Space
Station Program Office, other NASA organizations have been using MTLO resources at an
increasingly frequent rate, particularly for administrative support such as transportation and
accommodation arrangements. While other NASA program codes use MTLO services,
however, they do not contribute funding for these services.
2. PRIMARY OBSERVATIONS - NMLO/MTLO OPERATIONS
Since the establishment of a NASA presence in Russia, the efforts of the staffofthe
NMLO and the MTLO have been outstanding. The same applies to the individuals assigned to
the GCTC and the Mission Control Center - Moscow. NASA's presence in Russia to date has
been successful, partly because the NASA personnel assigned to Russia have overcome
numerous obstacles to establish their respective programs and have proven very effective in
working with their Russian counterparts. The NMLO/MTLO staffhas also established an
excellent working relationship with the Embassy. In fact, every Embassy official with whom
the Task Force members met praised the efforts and the professionalism of the NASA team in
Russia.
The NMLO/MTLO team, however, has been operating under significant handicaps
which greatly impede their ability to meet their objectives and to support Russian participation
in Phase 1, International Space Station Alpha (ISSA) development, and other NASA activities.
These handicaps also impact NASA's relationship with the Embassy and the Russians.
The most serious handicap is the absence of a single NASA official with overall
responsibility for the NASA presence in Russia. As explained in the previous section, these
responsibilities are currently shared by the NMLO manager and the MTLO manager. The lack
of a single NASA offficial in charge in Russia has caused the Ambassador and the Embassy
considerable frustration and concern. The Task Force members were told during the meetings
in Russia that NASA is the only Government agency operating at the Embassy without a
clearly identified lead individual. This is a very serious issue given the critical nature of
NASA's relationship with the Ambassador and the Embassy staff. The Russians also have been
confused by the lack of a single NASA official representing the Agency in Russia. To date,
there have been no serious problems; however, it has placed a burden on the Embassy
Environment, Science, and Technology Counselor who currently handles a number of
political/diplomatic areas for NASA, and who, on behaifofthe Ambassador, has responsibility
for NASA affairs at the Embassy.
To date, NASA has benefited from the support of Ambassador Pickering and his staff
The point has been reached, however, where the Embassy expects that NASA will identify a
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singleindividualwho will bearoverallresponsibilityfor NASA's presence in Russia, and who
will be able to integrate into the Embassy's country team and to support it fully. If NASA does
not meet these expectations quickly, it may jeopardize its relationship with the U.S. Embassy in
Moscow, a relationship which is important to the success ofU.S./Russian cooperation in
space.
In defining the role of the NASA Representative in Russia, the Agency must recognize
that senior Russian officials and the U.S. Ambassador expect the Representative to be a senior-
level envoy for the NASA Administrator who speaks with a single, credible voice for the
Agency. The U.S. Ambassador sees the Representative as responsible for the actions of all
NASA civil servants and contractors in Russia. That is not to imply that the Representative is
expected to control the technical content of the interactions between NASA organizations and
their Russian counterparts. The Ambassador, however, expects the Representative to be well
informed on the status of interactions between NASA and its Russian counterparts as well as
potential issues and problems. In the same vein, several Embassy officials stated quite clearly
that, to be effective, the NASA Representative must have the authority to remove from Russia
any NASA civil servant or NASA-directed contractor employee whose conduct, in his or her
determination, is not in the best interests of the Agency or is outside the hounds of the
individual's specific charter.
Currently important opportunities with the Russians may well not been recognized or
pursued due to the lack of a single, authoritative NASA representative in Moscow. More
importantly, numerous possibilities for serious miscommunication exist as a remit of the
current structure. Finally, although no major stumbling block has appeared in the course of
NASA's activities in Russia which would have required the quick reaction of the
Representative, it would be a mistake to assume that such an event will not occur. The
absence of a single individual who represents the Administrator, can speak for the Agency, and
who is credible to senior Russian officials seriously hampers effective interaction between
NASA and senior officials of the Russian Government and aerospace sector.
In the Task Force's opinion, the current level of interaction between NASA
organizations and their Russian counterparts will not remain static. The past several years
have witnessed a widening and deepening of those relationships. This trend will continue as
ISSA moves into development and implementation, and other cooperative activities (e.g.,
Mission to Planet Earth, planetary exploration, aeronautics, etc.) are initiated. The continued
absence of a single NASA point of contact for this deepening, widening relationship may
seriously impede progress, result in missed opportunities and expose the agency to a higher
level of risk.
As of the publication of this report, NASAis in the process of selecting an individual to
be the NASA Representative in Russia. However, it is the opinion of the Task Force, that the
8
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roles, responsibilities and authority of that position, as advertised, do not reflect the broad
authority which is required given the broad scope and range of NASA activities currently
underway in and with Russia. NASA should consider an expanded role for the NASA
Representative in Russia.
Finally, the Task Force notes that the absence of a written charter for the NASA
Representative, subscribed to by the NASA Administrator and senior NASA management, will
significantly hamper the Representative's effectiveness. No such charter currently exists, and
the Task Force is unaware of any effort within NASA to develop one. Without a clearly
defined charter, the NASA Representative will have a difficult time establishing the roles,
responsibilities, and authority of this critical position as well as rapidly developing the
necessary relationships with senior Russian officials.
2.1 Primary Recommendations
Recommendation: 3-2.1.1
Develop written guidelines to enable the NASA Representative in Russia, once selected,
to build a credible charter. To be most effective, the charter should clearly state that the
NASA Representative in Russia:
Speaks for the Administrator on behalf of all NASA elements operating in Russia.
Has direct access to the NASA Administrator.
Advises the NASA Administrator and senior NASA officials on U.S. foreign policy
objectives and Russian space developments as they affect NASA program activities.
Assures that the initiation, formulation, coordination, negotiation, implementation, and
monitoring of bilateral and multilateral agreements with Russia are consistent with U.S.
foreign policy and NASA project/program guidance.
Coordinates through the NASA Office of External Relations (Code I) for management
of administrative and support functions in Russia.
Has the authority to remove from Russia any NASA civil servant or NASA contractor
who exceeds the charter of his or her respective organization or who jeopardizes the
Agency through his or her actions.
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Recommendation3-2.1.2:
Complete the selection process for a NASA Representative in Russia with expanded
responsibilities as soon as possible.
. ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS - NASA ORGANIZATIONS OPERATING
IN PUS SIA
3.1 Background
None of theNASA organizationscurrentlyoperatinginRussia has developed a charter
which clearlydescribesthe scope of itsactivities,objectivesand the rolesof civilservantsor
contractorpersonnelworking in,or travelingtoRussia. In addition,thereislimited
coordinationbetween allof the disparateNASA elements operatinginRussia. And atthis
point,thereisno NASA Headquarters oversightover the activitiesofthe variousNASA
organizations' activities.
Not only is this approach inefficient, it also exposes NASA to a higher level of risk of
confusing or contradictory messages being given to Russian officials and organizations. With a
number of NASA organizations operating independently in Russia, the possibility that
confusing or contradictory messages will be given to Russian officials and organizations is
significantly greater than it would be if the NASA Representative was kept abreast of the
objectives and activities of NASA organizations operating in Russia.
Another area of consideration is the long-term staffing of NASA activities in Russia.
NASA management should recognize the unique challenges NASA civil servants face living
and working in Russia given the existing cultural and language barriers and living conditions
which differ markedly from those in the U.S. For this reason, NASA's should evaluate its
requirements and processes for recruiting, preparing and retaining well-qualified civil servants
to serve in Russia.
3.2 Additional Recommendations - NASA Organizations Operating in Russia
Recommendation 3-3.2.1:
Each NASA organization operating in Russia must provide a charter for its activities to
the NASA Representative in Russia. This charter must dearly spell out the scope of the
organization's activities and the roles of any civil servants or contractors working in or
traveling to Russia.
lO
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Recommendation3-3.2.2:
Each NASA organization operating in Russia must coordinate with, and provide regular
status reports to, the NMLO regarding its activities in Russia.
Recommendation 3-3.2.3:
Each NASA organization operating in Russia should develop a plan to:
actively recruit qualified candidates;
offer the benefits (e.g., housing, home leave, differential pay, etc.) necessary to attract
qualified candidates;
carefully screen candidates;
provide a career development path for each individual who chooses to serve;
ensure adequate language and cultural training (the National Foreign Affairs Training
Center 44-week course is highly recommended by the Department of State and the
Department of Defense); and
develop a pool of qualified and prepared candidates available to serve in Russia.
3.3 Additional Observations - NMLO Budget and Budget Support
As discussed previously, both the NMLO and the MTLO have been providing support
not just for Phase 1 and Space Station operations, but for other NASA activities in Russia as
well. A far more equitable arrangement and more efficient and cost-effective approach would
be to create a single budget coveting the administrative operations of the NMLO/MTLO and
administrative support to other NASA entities operating in Russia.
The current system for funding services is very inefficient. Individual vouchers are
prepared for almost any item or service required while funding must be transferred to the
Embassy for each expenditure. Given the detailed accounting provided by the Embassy
system, a more efficient approach would be to provide to the Embassy lump sum amounts
which could be used as needed with each expenditure tied to the NASA organization requiring
the goods or services. Such an approach would be far more effective than the current one and
would provide NASA with a detailed accounting of support costs in Russia as well as an
accurate method for developing budget projections.
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The managers and staff of the NMLO/MTLO made a number of specific suggestions
for improving the way they do business. One specific example was to use direct-hire Russian
employees rather than contract employees. According to their analysis, such an approach
significantly reduces costs, avoids Embassy restrictions and provides for better management.
Another suggestion was to establish a NMLO/MTLO travel budget under the direct control of
the office. These options, as well as several other possible areas of cost savings, were
suggested to the Task Force; however, at this time the Task Force members have not
conducted an in-depth review of these options.
To explore these and other options for improving the efficiency and cost-effectiveness
of the NMLO/MTLO office, NASA should assign a budget and finance expert at Headquarters
to work directly with the office. This individual should have the authority to establish policy
and procedures in this area with a minimum amount of review and approval.
3.4 Additional Recommendations - NMLO Budget and Budget Support
Recommendation 3-3.4.1:
NASA should develop a comprehensive financial plan for NMLO operations and
administrative support. NASA should also assign a budget expert at NASA
Headquarters to support the NMLO/MTLO operation. This individual should have the
authority to expedite solutions to the unique challenges facing that operation.
Each NASA organization operating in Russia should be required to:
clearly spell out, in a written charter, the scope of its activities in Russia and the roles
of any civil servants or contractors working in or traveling to Russia;
coordinate with and regularly status the NMLO on its activities in Russia;
allocate resources to the NMLO to cover administrative services.
3.5 Placing Civil Servants in Russian Space Organizations
As discussed previously, the Ambassador was initially opposed to placing NASA civil
servants in Russian space organizations; however, he has become more accepting of this
concept over time. As a result, NASA is beginning to be able to place personnel outside the
Embassy in Russian technical organizations.
An excellent example of the advantages of such placements for NASA was the
assignment of a NASA/ISC engineer as the Docking Mechanism Integrated Product Team
12
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representativeat RSC-Energia. In November 1994, Mr. Randy Brinkley, Manager, Space
Station Program Office (SSPO) at JSC requested that the NMLO/MTLO make arrangements
to assign a NASA docking specialist who would be located at the RSC-Energia facility. With
the approval of NASA and RSC-Energia, this employee was assigned as the technical
representative to the Russians for design, manufacture and testing of docking hardware.
Administratively this employee reports to the MTLO manager at the Embassy, but takes
technical direction _om the Engineering Directorate at JSC. He coordinates with JSC and
contractor personnel to resolve technical issues related to the docking mechanism systems and
hardware. Initially, this concept met resistance within NASA, but it has proved invaluable.
There is no substitute for personal interaction and on on-site presence, especially when there
are technical interface requirements to meet. Given the cultural and language barriers involved
in doing business in Russia, on site placement is definitely more effective in building working
relationships than videoconferencing and teleconferencing. It is the Task Force's opinion that
NASA should continue to pursue relocating more engineers from the U.S. Embassy compound
to Russian technical organizations.
13
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1. ADP/T TEAM EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.1 Charter
On December 6, 1994, NASA Administrator, Mr. Daniel Goldin, requested that
Lt. Gen. Thomas P. Stafford (Ret.), _ in his role as the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) Advisory Council Task Force chairman on the Shuttle-Mir
Rendezvous and Docking Missions, "Lead a team composed of several task force members
and technical advisors to Russia to review preparations and readiness for the upcoming
International Space Station Phase I missions."
The fourth report of the above task force activity provided an observation relative to
the delays in the installation of institutional automated data processing/telecommunications
(ADP/T) equipment in Russia and a recommendation that the implementation of the ADP/T
capabilities in Russia be given a high priority. 2
On April 7, 1995, Dr. Bradford Parkinson, Chairman of the NASA Advisory Council,
wrote to Lt. Gen. Thomas P. Stafford, "I would ask that you continue your activities to ...
review the overall NASA and associated contractor presence in Russia... including the
communications capability among NASA and contractor sites in Russia and locations in the
United States. ''3
1.2 Major Findings
Finding 1:
In the team's opinion, the processes for the collection of institutional ADP/T
requirements and the implementation of those requirements are adequate and working.
However, the communications capabilities between the U.S. and Russia are still limited, and
the estimated installation completion for current requirements is the end of 1995, due to the
foUowing observations:
Letter, Mr. Daniel S. Goldin, NASA Administrator, to Lt. Gen. Thomas P. Stafford, Chairman of the NASA
Advisory Council Task Force on the Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and Docking Missions, December 6, 1994 (see
Appendix 1)
2 The Fourth Report of the Task Force on the Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and Docking Missions, March 1, 1995
3 Letter, Dr. Bradford Parkinson to Lt. Gen. Thomas P. Stafford on the Task Force on Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous
and Docking Missions, April 7, 1995 (see Appendix 2)
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Observation 1:
The Joint U.S./Russian Institutional Communication Requirements Document between
NASA and the Russian Space Agency (RSA) has not been agreed to and signed. The effects
of the lack of a formal agreement and signatures on this document are: (1) the site(s) design
and equipment acquisition are proceeding at risk and (2) the site implementation plans
currently being worked cannot be finalized.
Recommendation 4-1.2.1:
The Joint Institutional Communications Requirements (JICR) Working Group
and Johnson Space Center (JSC) Institutional Communications Requirements (ICR)
Panel should continue current processes until the U.S./Russian JICR Document is
signed. A reasonable target date for signing of the document is July 28, 1995.
Observation 2:
The site-specific implementation plans for each Russian facility/site have not been
finalized due to the lack of a signed U.S./Russian JICR Document.
Recommendation 4-1.2.2:
The site-specific implementation plans should be finalized within a 6-week
timeframe following RSA/NASA joint signing of the U.S./Russian JICR Document.
Observation 3:
An end-user information package (i.e., users manuals, reference guides, log-on
E-mail instructions, etc.) is needed in conjunction with institutional ADP equipment/software
to be utilized in Russia.
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Recommendation 4-1.2.3:
PSCN should include instructions for users of institutional ADP
equipment/software delivered to Russia as part of the deliverable Request For Service
(RFS) packages. Training requests should be addressed on a case-by-case basis.
Observation 4:
A logistics and depot maintenance plan is needed for institutional ADP/T equipment
located in Russia.
Recommendation 4-1.2.4:
Prior to implementation completion, a logistics and depot maintenance plan
should be developed. From this plan, a funding profile should be developed
Observation 5:
A property controlfmventory system for equipment located in Russian and U.S.
facilities is needed.
Recommendation 4-1.2.5:
A property control/inventory system should be developed for all equipment
located in Russian and U.S. facilities, including portable ADP equipment located at the
Moscow Technical Liaison Office (MTLO).
Observation 6:
There is currently no contract to provide ADP support in Russia. A Request for
Proposal (RFP) has been released for the selection of a contractor to provide ADP support in
Russia, and it is expected that the contract will be awarded by mid-September 1995.
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Finding 2:
There is no single identifiable manager responsible for the total process for installation
and operations and maintenance (O&M) of the institutional ADP/T infrastructure in Russia.
Recommendation 4-1.2.6:
The focal point of this activity will be in Russia; therefore, an Institutional
Communications Director position should be established in Russia with the following
major tasks:
Report directly to the NASA Moscow Senior Representative;
Responsible for the oversight of implementation of the site-specific plans;
Act as Contracting Officer's Technical Representative for O&M contracts;
Approve all changes to the signed NASA/Russian JICR Document;
Responsible for budget controls; and
Coordinate Russian activities with MSFC management.
Proposed Organization
I NASA /
Moscow I
DI___Instituti°nal /
Communications II
I .,,°. i
• Site Survey
- Implementation
- O&M
• Requirements
- Changes
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1.3 Basis for Confidence
The major finding that the processes in place to provide institutional ADP/T services to
NASA personnel in Russia are adequate and working is based on data reviews, interviews,
discussions, and interactive working sessions conducted by the Review Team in the United
States and a teleconference held with NASA personnel in Russia. Figure 1 provides an
overview of the Russian locations.
@ BEAR LAKE
GGTC, STAR CITY
O IBMIP*I
@ IBMP-2
O Im
(_ LIAISON OFFICE,U8 EMBASSY
KHRUNICHEV
O MMCC
MOSCOW STATEUNIVERSITY
O RSC..ENERGL_
O SHUKOV TOWER
O VOLGA APARTMSNTS
O CHKALOVSKY AFB
8km
Figure 1. Current Activities - Russian Project
Previous NASA work with the Russians on telecommunications that has served as a
pathfinder includes:
a. In 1993, interim service was installed by Program Support Communications
Network (PSCN) to:
- Russian Institute of Space (RSC-Energia)
- Institute for Biomedical Problems (IBMP)
- Institute of Space Research (IK1)
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b. In 1993, PSCN submitted design goals and concepts to provide long-term
support for telecommunications requirements in Russia, including the following:
- RSC-Energia
-IKI
- IBMP
- Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center, Star City (GCTC)
- RSA
1Vfir Mission Control Center (MMCC)
Mytishchi
Khrunichev
NASA Moscow Technical Liaison Office (MTLO)
C. In 1994, a communications contract was awarded to IDB, Worldcom by Computer
Sciences Corporation (CSC) under contract to Marshall Spare Flight Center
(MSFC) PSCN for installation, operations and maintenance for the Ostankino Hub,
tail circuits to end user's locations, and O&M of end user's equipment.
• _ACE rmsmuleH mlrnnl_
o°
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....
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• -...... mlrAU,,_,_U_UbmPt.AnlD -._ _Oa_ i
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Figure 2. Russian Infrastructure Plan: Current Status
The current status of the communications circuits in Russia from Ostankino Hub is
shown in Figure 2.
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PSCN has been providing telecommunication services to NASA for several years and
has an excellent record of managing and providing support to NASA programs requiring
international telecommunications. Russia is the first international partner to allow NASA to
coordinate the installation of circuits/services in-country.
As a result of discussions with and one-on-one direct interactions with the personnel
involved in the Russian ADP/T project, as well as the end users of the ADP/T services, the
Review Team concluded that professional, technically competent people are in place
throughout the Russian ADP/T project. In addition, strong working relationships between
Russian and U.S. counterparts have developed and are continuing to mature. These
relationships have fostered a sense of mutual trust, which is absolutely essential to the success
of not just Phase 1, but to the entire International Space Station program.
The following data was provided by Mr. Kenny Mitchell, Director of the NASA
Moscow Technical Liaison Office, to illustrate the traffic in E-mall between the United States
and the MTLO in the first 4 months of service:
March 1995
April 1995
May 1995
June 1995
E-MAIL E-MAIL TOTAL
OUT IN E-MAIL
597 1041 1638
874 603 1477
2500 1900 4400
3866 3091 6977
1.4
task:
Future Activity
The ADP/T Review Team believes the following activities are required to complete this
a. Temporarily disband the ADP/T Review Team;
b. Assign to MSFC a 6-month task to provide continuity (one person);
c. Reconvene the Review Team in October 1995 time frame in conjunction with the
STS-74 Task Force Review to assess:
- Status of JICR Document and site implementation plans;
- Status of operations and maintenance for telecommunications and ADP
equipment in Russia;
d. Visit specific Russian sites as part of the STS-74 Task Force visit to Russia; and
e. Generate a delta report.
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2. INTRODUCTION
2.1 Background
In May 1994, the Task Force on the Shuttle-Nfir Rendezvous and Docking Missions
was established by the NASA Advisory Council. Its purpose is to review Phase 1 (Shuttle-
Nflr) planning, training, operations, rendezvous and docking, and management and to provide
interim reports containing specific recommendations to the Advisory Council.
On December 6, 1994, NASA Administrator, Mr. Daniel Goldin, requested that
It. Gen. Thomas P. Stafford, as the NASA Advisory Council Task Force Chairman on the
Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and Docking Missions, "lead a team composed of several Task Force
members and technical advisors to Russia to review preparations and readiness for the
upcoming International Space Station Phase 1". 4
The fourth report of this Task Force activity provided an observation relative to the
rudimentary NASA ADP/T infrastructure in Russia and the delays in the installation of these
capabilities. The report further recommended that NASA give the implementation of these
institutional ADP/T capabilities in Russia a high priority.
On April 7, 1995, Dr. Bradford Parkinson, Chairman of the NASA Advisory Council,
wrote to It. Gen. Thomas P. Stafford, "I would ask that you continue your activities to
review the overall NASA and associated contractor presence in Russia... including the
communications capability among NASA and contractor sites in Russia and locations in the
United States. "s
2.2 ADP/T Review Team Charter
Based on the above background data, the following charter was developed:
Review processes for collecting, prioritizing, and documenting requirements for the
automated data processing/telecommunications (ADP/T) institutional resources
necessary to support Russian participation in Phase 1 and Space Station, as well as the
process for implementing and supporting the capabilities necessary to satisfy those
requirements.
4Letter,Mr. DanielS.Goldin,NASA Administrator,toLt.Gcn.Thomas P.Stafford,ChairmanoftheNASA
AdvisoryCouncilTaskForceon theShuttlc-MirRendezvousand DockingMissions,December6,1994
s Letter, Dr. Bradford Parkinson to Lt. Gen. Thomas P. Stafford on Task Force on Shuttle Rendezvous and
Docking Missions, April 9, 1995
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2.3 Methodology
It. Gen. Thomas P. Stafford assembled an Institutional ADP/T team, led by
David H. Mobley, NASA's Chief Engineer, and composed of several Keview Team members. 6
The ADP/T Review Team worked fulltime collecting data, conducting interviews, and
performing analysis of the data and information provided.
The team reviewed (1) the requirements identification, collecting and documenting
process; (2) the requirements implementation (design, acquisition, integration/testing,
shipment, and site installation/testing) processes; and (3) the sustaining operations and
maintenance processes. These are currently in place and designed to provide the institutional
ADP/T resources to support Russian participation in the Phase 1 and the International Space
Station, as well as other NASA activities in Russia.
Team members conducted considerable research obtaining and reviewing a wide range
of source material (see the Source Data Book, the table of contents of which is in Appendix 6),
including formal and informal documents, memorandums, letters, presentations, and
publications. Also, interviews and detailed discussions were held with a wide range of
individuals, including NASA and contractor managers, engineers, technicians, and technical
staffs located in the United States and Russia. Discussions were conducted with the Director
of the NASA Liaison Office, Mr. Kenny Mitchell, and the Director of the Astronaut Office at
Star City, Mr. Mike Baker, via newly installed phone lines.
In April 1995, the ADPfr Review Team attended a JICR Working Group biTweekly
meeting at JSC which was chaired by Mr. Barry Waddell. This group's purpose is to provide a
focal point for the identification, collection, approval, and documentation of the NASA and
Russian Institutional ADP/T requirements for deployment in Russia. An overview briefing was
also provided by Mr. Waddell which defined the purpose and scope of the JICR Working
Group and JSC ICR Panel. Interviews were conducted with Ms. Marianne Campbell, the
NASA PSCN representative located at JSC. Ms. Campbell provides the onsite working
interface with the JICR Working Group and JSC ICR Panel and submits the Request for
Service to the MSFC PSCN for implementation. The institutional ADP/T requirements are
expressed on the RFS form. Also, an interview was conducted with Ms. Debbie Williams, the
International Space Station sponsor on the JICR Working Group and JSC ICR Panel, and
major requester of institutional ADPfr services in Russia.
6 List of Review Team members (see Appendix 3)
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In May 1995, the ADP/T Review Team met with the MSFC PSCN organization to
receive an overview briefing on the implementation processes. Tours were also given of the
following areas that provide direct support to these processes: (1) the MSFC Helpdesk to
observe realtime activities, (2) the Network Management Center, a focal point for Russian
network problem resolution, (3) the NASA Teleconferencing Center to observe realtime
activities in arranging, monitoring, and conducting teleconferences, and (4) the Russian
Staging Laboratory (commonly called '_ittle Russia") where preshipment assembly,
integration, and testing of the hardware/software are performed. "Little Russia" simulates the
communication links to every Russian site. Interviews were conducted with representatives
from the CSC Customer Services, Engineering, and Operations organizations to obtain an
understanding of their functions and interrelationships.
In the May to June 1995 timefimne, an ADP/T team member participated in nearly
daily working sessions with the MSFC PSCN (CSC) engineers, managers, and technicians to
identify the following processes: (1) requirements integration and traceability, (2) requirements
implementation (site integrated design, integration hardware design, procurement
specifications, etc.), (3) sustaining operations and maintenance,(4) service management,
(5) travel preparation, (6) request for service, (7) RFS traceability, (8) schedules generation
and maintenance, (9) management structures, and (10) configuration management and
documentation control.
On May 31, 1995, the team was debriefed on the results of Mr. Waddell's trip to
Russia to obtain agreement with the RSA on the U.S./Russian JICR Document. Also on
June 2, 1995, the team was debriefed on the results of the MSFC PSCN representative's trip to
Russia to conduct site surveys, to oversee the installation of the communication equipment,
and for preliminary discussions on site implementation plans.
In June 1995, the team interviewed representatives from the NASA Communications
(NASCOM), NASA Science Intemet (NSI) and Code U/Headquarters to identify and
document their processes for submitting institutional ADP/T requirements for Russia to PSCN.
Also, discussions were held with IDB, Worldcom communications and support subcontractor
to CSC for institutional communications equipment installation and support in the Ostankino
Hub, tail circuits to Russian facilities, and O&M of this equipment. Followup meetings were
held with MSFC PSCN, CSC, and I-NET personnel to clarify questions and concerns and to
discuss preliminary observations and findings.
On July 19, 1995, an open meeting of the Task Force was held at JSC, and the ADP/T
Review Team members presented their findings and observations, as well as this final report, v
7 ADP/T Team Shuttle-Mir Task Force Final Report Presentation (see Appendix 4)
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3. FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS
The team was provided with tremendous cooperation and candor at all locations
visited. All parties, both end-item users and service providers, express confidence in the
current processes and agree that the processes are coordinated and focused.
Finding 1:
Based on the above data and the Review Team assessment of this data, it is concluded
that the processes for the collection of institutional ADP/T requirements and the
implementation of those requirements are adequate and working. However, the institutional
telecommunications capabilities between the United States and Russia are temporarily still
limited, and the estimated installation completion for current requirements is the end of 1995
due to the following observations:
Observation 1:
The Joint U.S./Russian Joint Institutional Communication Requirements Document
between NASA and RSA has not been agreed to and signed. The effects of a lack of formal
agreement and signatures on this document are: (1) the site design and equipment acquisition
are proceeding at risk and (2) the site implementation plans currently being worked cannot be
finalized.
Recommendation:
The HCR Working Group and JSC ICR Panel should continue current processes until
the U.S./Russian/ICR Document is signed. A reasonable target date for the signing of the
document is July 28, 1995.
Observation 2:
The site-specific implementations plans for each Russian facility/site have not been
finalized due to the lack ofa NASA/RSAjoint signing of the U.S./Russian HCR Document. 8
g See Appendix 5 for summary of the Site Implementation Plan. The complete plan is in the Source Data Book
(see Appendix 6)
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Recommendation"
The site-specific implementation plans should be finalized within a 6-week timeframe
following NASA/RSA joint signing of the NASA/Russian JICR Document.
Observation 3:
An end-user information package (i.e., users manuals, reference guides, log-on E-mail
instructions, etc.) is needed in conjunction with delivery of institutional ADP
equipment/soRware to be utilized in Russia.
Recommendation:
PSCN should include instructions for users of institutional ADP equipment/sottware
installed in Russia as part of the deliverable RFS packages. Training requests should be
addressed on a ease-by-case basis.
Observation 4:
A logistics and depot maintenance plan is needed for institutional ADP/T equipment
located in Russia.
Recommendation:
Prior to implementation completion, a logistics and depot maintenance plan should be
developed. From this plan, a funding profile should be developed.
Observation 5:
A property controlfmventory system for equipment located in Russian and U.S.
facilities is needed.
Recommendation:
A property control/inventory system should be developed for all equipment located in
Russian and U.S. facilities, including portable ADP equipment located at the MTLO.
12
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Observation 6:
There is currently no contract to provide ADP support in Russia. An RFP was released
for the selection of a contractor to provide ADP support in Russia, and it is expected that the
contract will be awarded by mid-September 1995.
Finding 2:
There is no single identifiable manager responsible for the total process for installation
and O&M of the institutional ADP/T infrastructure in Russia.
Recommendation:
The focal point ofthisactivity will be in Russia; therefore, an Institutional
Communications Director position should be established in Russia with the following major
tasks:
- Report directly to the NASA Moscow Senior Representative;
- Responsible for overseeing of implementation of the site-specific plans;
- Act as Contracting Officer's Technical Representative for O&M contracts;
- Approve all changes to the signed JICR Document;
- Responsible for budget controls; and
- Coordinate Russian activities with MSFC management.
4. PROCESSES
4.1 Process Overview
The following charts depict a simplified end-to-end flow that has been subdivided into
three major activities: (1) requirements, (2) implementation, and (3) sustaining operations and
maintenance (see Figure 3). Figure 4 identifies the major parties and organizations involved in
these processes.
4.2 Detail End-to-End Process Flows
Figures 5 and 6 provide a detailed end-to-end flow of the process. Subsequent charts
will further define the process steps.
13
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5.0 PEOPLE
As in any process, it is the people that make it work. The Review Team has gathered
data, held discussions, and interviewed the personnel to understand the process. The team has
also been evaluating the personnel. It is the unanimous opinion of this team that the personnel
involved in deploying the institutional ADP/T equipment, software, and infrastructure are
highly competent, motivated professionals dedicated to accomplishing their task.
14
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Institutional
Requirements (RFS)
I NA._ _ Inlemn_l(N-_)
NASAC__ (XASOOM)
CodeUHeaclgua_em
Implementmion
MSFC PSCN
I
Computer Sciences Corporalion
Engineering (Russian Project)
Telecommunical_n I
Backbone Sen__s _
ADP/End
User Services
Inlegrallonand ITe _
T_ I
Sustaining Operations and Maintenance
I ADP/EndUser
Cornmunice_one I S_=portSUdVldo.c_v
_l)c_¢'.dar I l.i,i.on Otl_
I Rumi_ilSull_ntnldorI
I I
Figure 3. Process Overview
Figure 4. Parties Involved in Process
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Appendix 1
Letter, Mr. Daniel S. Goldin to
Lt. Gen. Thomas P. Stafford, December 6, 1994
A-1
National Aeronautics and
S_ce Administration
Office of the Administrator
Washington, DC 20546-0001
Lieutenant General Thomas P. Stafford, USA/: (Ret.)
Stafford, Burke and Hecker, Inc.
1006 Cameron Street
Alexandria, VA 22314
Dear Gen. Stafford:
I am requesting that, in your role as Chair of the NASA Advisory
Council Task Force on the Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and Docking Missions,
you lead a team composed of several Task Force members and technical
advisors to Russia to review preparations and readiness for the upcoming
international Space Station Phase 1 missions. Given the outstanding work
the Task Force has produced to date, as well as your pemonal rapport with
members of the Russian Space Program, I believe that a team led by you
will provide NASA with an additional level of confidence.
I would like to receive your report prior to March 1, 1995. Please
accept my gratitude for the valuable work you and your team have already
done and for assisting NASA further in this critical effort. If I can be of any
assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Sincerely, 7Y
Daniel _ Goldin
A_tmtor
A-2
Appendix 2
Letter, Dr. Bradford Parkinson to
Lt. Gen. Thomas P. Stafford, April 7, 1995
A-3
NASA Advisory Council
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, DC 20546
Lt.Gen. Thomas P. Stafford, USAF
Stafford, Burke and Hecker, Inc.
1006 Cameron Street
Alexandria, VA 22314
Dear Gen_d: TOrvt..-
/ID_ 7 "_e-
First, let me thank you and your task force for your excellent work in
reviewing preparations in Russia for the Phase IA missions (Soyuz TM-21,
Mir 18 Main Expedition, and STS-71). I greatly appreciate the effort required
to conduct such a comprehensive review and to produce a report in little more
than two months. There is no question that the effort by you and the other
members of the task force have made a significant contribution to the success of
the ShUttle-Mir phase of the international Space Station program.
I have contacted the NASA Administrator, Mr. Daniel S. Goldin, and
we would very much appreciate it if you could continue your review of the
upcoming Shuttle-Mir missions, specifically incorporating lessons learned from
missions already accomplished, and provide your recommendations with
adequate time for implementation. Specific areas of interest are: use of the
Orbiter Docking System on STS-71, analysis of STS-63 mission data for
lessons learned and other data applicable to upcoming missions, and assessment
of the flight readiness for the STS-71 and STS-74 missions.
In addition, I would ask that you continue your activities to review the overall
NASA and associated contractor presence in Russia. Specific areas of interest
arc: the structure and relationship of NASA organizations participating in the
Phase I program at all sites in Russia; the working relationship among civil
servants and NASA contractors in Russia; the distribution of human resources
between Phase 1 and Phase 2 activities, including the adequacy of current
staffing levels; and the communications capability among NASA and contractor
sites in Russia and locations in the United States.
Please include the results of these examinations in your next report. Again,
thank you for all of your hard work and that of your Task Force and for your
continued commitment to the success of the Human Space Flight Program.
Sincerely,
Bradford W. Parkinson
Chair, NASA Advisory Council
cc: Mr. William L. Vantine
A-4
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Review Team Members
A-5
NASA Advisory Council Task Force on the Shuttle Mir
Rendezvous and Docking Missions
Review Team Members
STS-71 and STS-74 Preparation Team
Maj. Gen. Joe. H. Engie, USAF (Ket.), Lead
President, Engie Technologies, Inc.
1906 Back Bay Court
Houston, TX 77058
Capt. WiUiam F. Readdy, USNR
Flight Crew Operations, Code CB
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Houston, TX 77058
Russian Review - Management Team
Col. James C. Adamson, USA (Ret.), Lead
President
Locheed Martin Engineering and Sciences
2625 Bay Area Boulevard
Houston, TX 77058
Mr. Joseph Cuzzupoli
Senior Vice President
American Pacific Corporation
3770 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 300
Las Vegas, NV 89109
Mr. David Jossi
Vice President
Engle Technologies, Inc.
201 1 Street, S.W.
Suite 807
Washington, DC 20024
A-6
Mr. Gilbert Kirkham
Executive Secretary, NAC Task Force
on the Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous
and Docking Missions
Code MOC
Office of Space Hight
NASA Headquarters
Washington, DC 20546-0001
Mr. Glyrm Lunney
President
Rockwell Space Operations Company
Code R01A
600 Gemini Avenue
Houston, TX 77058-2777
Mr. David Mobley
Assistant to the Center Director for Space Station
DAO1
Marshall Space Flight Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Huntsville, AL 85812-0001
Capt. William F. Readdy, USNR
Flight Crew Operations, Code CB
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Houston, TX 77058
Automated Data Processing/Telecommunications (ADP/T) Review Team
Mr. David Mobley, Lead
Assistant to the Center Director for Space Station
DAO1
Marshall Space FlightCenter
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Huntsville, AL 35812-0001
Mr. Joseph Cuzzupoli
Senior Vice President
American Pacific Corporation
3770 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 300
Las Vegas, NV 89109
A-7
Mr. John Horan
Vice President and General Manager
I-NET, Inc.
Mail Stop INI-1
HQ Building, Room 3144
Kennedy Space Center, FL 32899
Dr. Judy Krause
Principal Analyst
I-NET, Inc.
4717 University Drive, Suite 98
Huntsville, AL 35816
Mr. Perry Rogers
Chief, Communications Division
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Mail Stop DL-CMD
HQ Building, Room 3480
Kennedy Space Center, FL 32899
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ADP/T Team Shuttle-Mir Task Force
Final Report Presentation, July 19, 1995
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Appendix 5
Implementation Plan for NASA
Telecommunications and ADP/LAN
Requirements to Russia, June 8, 1995
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IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
FOR
NASA TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND ADP/I..,AN
REQUIREMENTS TO RUSSIA
Marshall Space Flight Center
Program Support Communications Project Office
June 8, 1995
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The plan for implementation of tciccomnmnications and ADP/Local Atca Network
(LAN) requirements to Russia by the MSFC PSCN Project is comprised of five elements
described as follows:
I. Management Plan
A plan for project management of extension of the PSCN backbone into Russia was
created in response to receipt of requirements for network connectivity by several NASA
project offices. These project offices' requirements were to support joint endeavors
between NASA and Russian counterparts for science research and manned space flight,
pursuant to Cooperative Agreements signed by the U.S. and Russian Presidents.
IL Joint U.S./Russia Institutional Communications Requirements Document
This document identifies telecommunications and ADP/LAN support requirements
between NASA and Russian counterparts as agreed to by a joint (JICR) working group.
The JICR is co--chaired by NASA, B. Waddell, and a Russian Space Agency
representative, V. Grigoriev. Tile working group includes membership from project
offices and a PSCN project representative. Tiffs group will manage and control
programmatic requirements for telecommunications and ADP/LAN requirements
between NASA and Russian locations. The baseline document, and future changes
thereto, will be provided to tile PSCN project from the NASA working group co-
chairman.
HI. Requirements Priorities
As described in Section II, above, requirements for NASA-Russian
telecommunications and ADP/LAN services are received and approved by the JICR..The
priority for implementation of the initial baseline listings for locations and services was
provided to PSCN from the NASA working group co-chairman. Similar guidance will
continue to be provided for future changes to service requirements.
IV. Comprehensive Listings of RFS's
While the JICR document described in Section II, above, describes coordinated
NASA-Russian progr_lm agreements for telecommunications and ADP/LAN support
requirements, the implementation of specific requirements requires a Request for Service
(RFS), which identifies the schedule need date, funding authority, and other site-specific
information needed for the PSCN Project Office to proceed. A comprehensive listing of
RFS's for implementation of NASA-Russian services is maintained for the Russia
Project.
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V. Project Implementation Schedules
Implementation schedules are prepared and maintained which reflect design,
procurement, installation, and operational readiness for new services to Russia.
Current revisions/copies of the PSCN Implementation Plan elements to deliver
telecommunications and ADP/LAN services to Russia are attached.
2
PSC Project Manager
Attachments
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Appendix 6
ADP/T Team Shuttle-Mir Task Force
Source Data Book
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ITEM
NUMBER
FORMAL
F-1
F-1.1
F-1.2
F-1.3
F-1.4
F-1.5
F-2
F-3
F-4
INFORMAL
I-1
I-2
I-3
I-4
I-5
I-6
I-7
I-8
ADPT/T TEAM
SHUTFLE-MIR TASK FORCE
SOURCE DATA BOOK
, TABLE OF CONTENTS
TITLE
Implementation Plan for NASA Telecommunications and ADP/LAN -
Requirements to Russia
Management Plan for NASA-PSCN Telecommunications Services to
Russia
Joint U.S./Russia Institutional Communications Requirements
Document dated May 23, 1995
Requirements by Program Office
Priorities for Russian Communications Installations
Russian Project Schedule dated June 7, 1995
IDB Statement of Work
IDB CDR- Phase B
Program Support Communications Requirements Document
(PSCRD), Volume III Part A, Future Requirements (Headquarters
Code D)
JICR Working Group Agenda dated April 26, 1995
Minutes of JICR dated April 26, 1995
Project Schedule - Russia RFS's CSC/NASA dated April 25, 1995
Russian Project Status as of May 11, 1995
Requirements for Network, MCC Communications Systems, Ground
Facilities and Consulting Groups for Joint USA/Russia Manned
Spaceflight
Russian Requirements (MTLO)
Sample Requirements Traceability System (RTS)
PSCN Communications Drawings
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ITEM
NUMBER
LETTERS
L-1
L-2
L-3
I.-4
PRESENTATIONS
P-1
P-2
P-3
TITLE
Letter from Wayne Littles to Officials in Charge of Headquarters
Offices; Directors, OSF Field Installations; Phase 1 Program Manager
dated April 17, 1995
Letter from Tommy Holloway (Code YA), Subject: Establishment and
Authorization of the Russian Communications Requirements Panel
dated December 20, 1994
Letter from Bradford Parkinson to It. General Thomas P. Stafford
dated April 7, 1995
Letter from Lt. General Thomas P. Stafford to Bradford Parkinson
dated June 6, 1995
NASA PSCN Russian Project Overview
International Initiatives/Activity
Russian Institutional Communications Requirements
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Acronym List
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Appendix 8
Task Force Members
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Task Force on the Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and Docking Missions
Chairman
It. Gen. Thomas P. Stafford, USAF (Ret.)
Stafford, Burke and Hecker, Inc.
1006 Cameron Street
Alexandria, VA 22314
Review Team Members
Col. James C. Adamson, USA (Ret.)
President
Lockheed Engineering and Sciences Company
2625 Bay Area Boulevard
Houston, TX 77058
Mr. Joseph Cuzzupoli
Senior Vice President
American Pacific Corporation
3770 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 300
Las Vegas, Nevada 89109
Dr. John Fabian
President and CEO
ANSER
1215 Jefferson Davis Highway
Suite 800
Arlington, VA 22202
Dr. Craig L. Fischer
President and CEO
Fischer Associates
82013 Dr. Carreon Boulevard
Indio, CA 92201
Dr. Michael A. Greenfield
Deputy Associate Administrator
Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, Code Q
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, DC 20546-0001
Mr. James M. Heflin, Jr.
JSC Projects Office, Code FA
Lyndon B. lolmson Space Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Houston, TX 77058
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